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OF CARROTS AND STICKS: GENERAL
JURISDICTION AND GENUINE CONSENT
Craig Sanders
ABSTRACT—The United States Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler
AG v. Bauman changed how the courts will determine whether companies
should be subject to general personal jurisdiction. In 1945, Pennoyer v.
Neff’s geographical fixation gave way to International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, which provided a test for courts to determine whether
corporations had sufficient contact with a forum to meet the bar for
personal jurisdiction there. Specific jurisdiction requires “minimum
contacts,” provided the action is satisfactorily related to the forum.
However, to be subject to general jurisdiction, a corporation must possess
more than just “minimum contacts,” and claimants can bring actions in
forums where companies are subject to general jurisdiction regardless of
whether those actions have any relationship to that forum. Precisely how
much contact a company must have with a forum to be subject to general
jurisdiction has evolved since International Shoe, and Daimler is the most
current iteration.
Analyzing general jurisdiction by pinpointing a company’s level of
contact with a particular forum can be a superfluous exercise. The case law
has developed such that “consent” can overcome even a remarkable lack of
contacts with a particular forum and subject a company to general
jurisdiction. Some courts have interpreted a corporation’s registration and
appointment of someone to accept service of process in a state as implied
consent to general jurisdiction. Others at least require a state’s registration
procedure to explicitly mandate the company submit to general jurisdiction.
Daimler, and its recent progeny, may have signaled the death knell for at
least implied consent to general jurisdiction by virtue of registration and
perhaps for explicit consent as well. Some courts and commentators are
rightly noting that mandating consent as the cost of doing business in a
particular forum is consent in name only. While courts used to give
credence to the legal fictions of corporate consent and corporate presence,
they are now striking them down as violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
This Note seeks to address how states can maintain general
jurisdiction over corporations that do not meet Daimler’s apparent demand
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that a company be “at home” in the forum. The inevitable chipping away of
states’ registration statutes as sufficient (impliedly or explicitly) for general
jurisdiction potentially leaves a viable alternative intact: genuine consent.
States might look to structure a form of incentive-based consent by use of
their regulatory or taxing authority. States can craft solutions based on how
important it is to them to provide their courtrooms to those who would seek
redress from corporations operating within their borders. Additionally, an
incentive-based genuine consent to jurisdiction serves the ancillary benefit
of ensuring more companies go through the proper channels of a state’s
registration process, including filling out the appropriate paperwork,
instead of operating outside its bounds.
After Daimler, states will have to decide whether, and how, to adapt
their corporate registration statutes to ensure their courts remain open to
claims based on general jurisdiction. This Note will put forward solutions
so that states will be able to craft new legislation before the courts
invalidate their reliance on fictional consent.
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2017; B.B.A.,
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INTRODUCTION
Consider this scenario: Sarah owns a farm equipment business,
Northwest Harvest, that has been in her family for three generations. The
business is based out of Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, and primarily sells to
farmers in Idaho, Montana, and eastern Washington. The company also
makes a specific type of combine tool that has become very popular in
parts of the Midwest. To meet this demand, Northwest Harvest partnered
with a farm equipment company in Topeka, Kansas, leasing a small space
in its store and selling directly to local farmers. Since Northwest Harvest is
selling product in Kansas, Sarah had to register her business in the state. As
this Note will discuss, some states craft registration statutes that expressly
mandate that out-of-state corporations must defend against any lawsuit
brought within the state, simply because the company registered to do
business or appointed someone to accept service of process there. Kansas’s
registration statute does not.1 Under these facts, Northwest Harvest would
be required to defend against lawsuits in Kansas related to the combine
tool. But what about unrelated lawsuits? What if Sarah, as part of operating
her Idaho business, neglected the upkeep of her physical storefront in Idaho
and an employee got severely injured as a result? If an attorney convinced
the employee that he should sue in Kansas because the jury verdicts are
much higher there, should Sarah have to defend against the negligence suit
in Kansas? What if Kansas’s registration statute, rather than being silent on
the issue of whether registering a business in the state is sufficient for its
courts to assert general jurisdiction, says precisely that—all businesses
operating within its borders shall be subject to general jurisdiction in the
state? Does that make a difference in the negligence suit? Should it? What
changes could Kansas make in its statutory regime, if any, to ensure its
courts are able to hear any and all suits brought against those companies
who register and operate within its borders? This Note seeks to address
these questions.
This Note will proceed in Section I.A by first describing the history of
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, leading up to
Daimler AG v. Bauman.2 This Section will then summarize Daimler and
explain how it has altered the Court’s general jurisdiction analysis as it
relates to power over corporations for conduct not related to the forum
state. Section I.B will discuss how, with the power analysis altered, states
and litigants have attempted to rely on a consent-based approach regarding
registration statutes to claim general jurisdiction over corporations. Section
1
2

See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7931, 17-7934 (2016).
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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II.A will provide a case comparison to illustrate the problem created by the
absence of any coherent rule as to whether compliance with a state’s
mandatory registration requirements is sufficient for a state to demonstrate
corporate consent while Section II.B will show that the consent-based
rationale is lacking. In Section II.C, this Note will address potential
solutions the states could implement to maintain general jurisdiction over
corporations operating within their borders without running afoul of the
Due Process Clause.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Goodyear and Daimler Change the Power Analysis

The power analysis refers to whether—through the courts—plaintiffs
can force defendants to submit to suit in a particular forum. A state’s
jurisdictional power over defendants is couched in either specific “conductlinked” jurisdiction or general “all-purpose” jurisdiction.3 Specific
jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular state requires both that a
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum [s]tate”4 and that those activities “give rise to the
liabilities sued on.”5 Applying specific jurisdiction to the initial scenario, a
suit in Idaho would withstand a court’s jurisdictional inquiry since the
negligence action involved property in that state. However, the
circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s Kansas suit are unlikely to involve
sufficient minimum contacts to establish specific jurisdiction since the
physical storefront has no relation to Kansas. A state can also claim general
jurisdiction over defendants in certain circumstances, which would allow
lawsuits on any matter, whether bearing a relation to the forum state or not.
A state exercising general jurisdiction over a defendant may subject that
defendant to suits in its courts regardless of the issues in dispute.6
In 1945, the Supreme Court decided the seminal International Shoe v.
Washington case,7 which broke with Pennoyer v. Neff’s elevation of states’
geographical boundaries8 and provided that states could use nonresident
3

Id. at 751 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The Court noted that some level of purposeful
availment will always be necessary to satisfy that a defendant has sufficient “minimal contacts.” Id. at
251 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
5
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
6
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
7
326 U.S. 310.
8
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (holding that suits to determine liability for defendants require that the
defendant “must be brought within [the state’s] jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or . . .
voluntary appearance”).
4
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defendants’ activities within state borders to claim personal jurisdiction
over defendants.9 The Court’s first stake in the ground in International
Shoe was that general jurisdiction could lie where there are “continuous
corporate operations within a state . . . so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.”10 Without clarity for lower courts, the
Supreme Court’s holding yielded many factors courts would consider,
including whether a company had employees or a place of business within
the state, whether it targeted advertisements to the state’s residents, and
how much product it sold in the state.11
This broad, factor-based analysis existed until 2011 when the Court
decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.12 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, inserted a key phrase—“essentially
at home”—in what otherwise would have been a standard International
Shoe recitation of general jurisdiction.13 This seemingly innocuous phrase
tightened the reins on future general jurisdiction analyses, which now
require a company to have more than merely continuous or substantial
contact with the state. Goodyear provided that a corporation will generally
only be subject to general jurisdiction in the state where it is incorporated
or has its principal place of business.14 Three years after Goodyear, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the narrow set of circumstances in which a
company may be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Daimler.15
In Daimler, the Court found “unacceptably grasping” the plaintiffs’
contention that general jurisdiction should apply whenever a company
“engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” in
a state.16 Daimler involved Argentinian plaintiffs who attempted to sue the
German automotive company, Daimler AG, in a California federal court
9

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The Court provided further that allowing these types of suits should
comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
10
Id. at 318.
11
Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2015).
12
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
13
Id. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (emphasis added)
(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).
14
Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721,
728 (1988)).
15
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
16
Id. at 760–61 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 16 & n.7, 17 & n.8, Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 4495139.
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based on a subsidiary’s substantial business contacts within California.17
The subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, had a number of facilities in
California and was “the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the California
market.”18 The Court held that California could not exercise general
jurisdiction over Daimler.19 Even imputing the subsidiary’s contacts to the
parent corporation would not satisfy the plaintiffs’ assertion of general
jurisdiction, as the Court found that general jurisdiction was appropriate
only where a defendant is “at home,” and reasserted Goodyear’s two
examples of “home” as “where [a company] is incorporated or has its
principal place of business.”20 The Court indicated a broader, more
grasping general jurisdiction would not permit out-of-state defendants to
conduct themselves in a way in which they could have some expectation of
where they might be subject to litigation.21 This ruling then served the dual
purpose of allowing defendants to predict where they might be subject to
suit while also guaranteeing “at least one clear and certain forum in which a
corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”22 In Daimler’s
wake, plaintiffs’ shrinking power to claim general jurisdiction over
corporations not meeting one of the two stated conditions has encouraged
them to seek out an alternative method of claiming general jurisdiction.
B.

Consent as a Daimler Escape Hatch

As complex as the previous jurisdictional analyses may be, Daimler
certainly seems to have simplified the inquiry. If a company does not
consent to general jurisdiction, a court must conduct a power analysis.
States, companies, and courts are looking to clarify both what constitutes
consent, and—in the wake of Goodyear and Daimler—whether consentbased jurisdiction will be subject to a due process analysis or exempt from
it. Before Goodyear, large national and multinational corporations saw

17

Id. at 750–51.
Id. at 752.
19
Id. at 760.
20
Id. The Court held to its previous ruling in Goodyear and maintained that Goodyear did not
restrict general jurisdiction only to those places where a company is incorporated or has its principal
place of business, but it might be difficult to produce a ready example falling outside those two areas.
Indeed, the Court stated in a footnote:
18

We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a corporation’s operations in
a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.
Id. at 761 n.19 (citation omitted). That the Court did not point to an example might give credence to the
idea that general jurisdiction should be available in limited places.
21
Id. at 761–62 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
22
Id. at 760.
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little reason to contest the consent issue since an analysis of their contacts
would likely have satisfied general jurisdiction.23 Now, litigants can no
longer rely on general jurisdiction based on a power analysis for those
corporations not satisfying Daimler’s “at home” test. They must instead
turn to consent to assert general jurisdiction. The remainder of Section I.B
will proceed by examining the origins of registration statutes and corporate
consent, tracing their jurisprudential evolution, and demonstrating that the
current reliance on consent is insufficient to assert general jurisdiction over
a corporation.
1.

Origins and Evolution of Registration Statutes and Corporate
Consent.—In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,24 the Supreme Court
articulated a general rule that “a corporation can have no legal existence
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.”25 However,
in that same opinion, the Court provided an exception allowing “foreign
corporations” to contract within jurisdictions outside of their boundaries
“when they are not contrary to the known policy of the state, or injurious to
its interests.”26 The Court then rejected the argument that—since the
Constitution is silent on this issue—this relationship applies only to foreign
nations and not the states:
The intimate union of these states, as members of the same great political
family; the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together;
should lead us, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater
degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards one another, than we
should be authorized to presume between foreign nations.27

The Court had legitimized one state’s jurisdiction over another’s corporate
entity provided the corporation consented to the host state’s conditions.28
In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,29 the Court took the next step.
The issue of jurisdictional consent to a registration statute arose within the
Bank of Augusta exception.30 In Lafayette, the Supreme Court held that
Ohio could assert jurisdiction over an insurance company incorporated in
Indiana as a condition for allowing the company to conduct business in
23

See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (holding
“continuous and systematic” contacts sufficient to assert general jurisdiction).
24
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
25
Id. at 588.
26
Id. at 589−90.
27
Id. at 590.
28
Id. at 589.
29
59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
30
Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to
Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 12 (1990).

1329

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Ohio.31 Ohio was free to impose conditions, and those “conditions [had to]
be deemed valid and effectual by other States, . . . provided they are not
repugnant to the [C]onstitution or laws of the United States.”32 However,
the Lafayette Court still required Ohio’s conditions to be related to the
insurance business transacted in Ohio.33
The landmark case of Pennoyer34 confirmed the above rationale but
also provided the genesis for an alternative principle.35 The Court asserted
that states can “require a nonresident entering into a partnership or
association within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to
appoint an agent . . . to receive service of process” to ensure those
companies were bound by the states’ judgments.36 However, Pennoyer’s
introduction of the agent’s “presence” as part of the analysis sowed the
seed of a separate, broader principle than Lafayette stated.37 Four years after
Pennoyer, the Court decided St. Clair v. Cox.38 Once again, it held for the
broad principles of contacts-based jurisdiction, endorsing essentially the
same elements as Pennoyer.39 Whether express or implied, the Court
sanctioned states’ conditions that nonresident companies consent to service,
provided the suit is related to the activities within the host state.40 However,
the “presence” seed sown in Pennoyer began to grow in St. Clair. The
Court, referring to a corporation, stated, “Serving process on its agents in
other states, for matters within the sphere of their agency, is, in effect,
serving process on it as much so as if such agents resided in the state where
it was created.”41 The Court had thus far held that registration statutes
conditioning corporate consent to service were based only on those
transactions related to the forum. However, Pennoyer and St. Clair also
found that corporations consenting to appoint an agent on whom to serve
31

59 U.S. (18 How.) at 407.
Id. at 407.
33
Id. at 408 (“[W]hen this corporation sent its agent into Ohio, with authority to make contracts of
insurance there, the corporation must be taken to assent to the condition upon which alone such
business could be there transacted by them . . . .”).
34
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
35
See Kipp, supra note 30, at 14–15.
36
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.
37
See Kipp, supra note 30, at 15.
38
106 U.S. 350 (1882).
39
Id. at 356 (“The State may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation
shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any litigation arising out
of its transaction in the State, it will accept as sufficient the service of process on its agents or persons
specially designated; and the condition would be eminently fit and just. And such condition and
stipulation may be implied as well as expressed.” (emphasis added)).
40
Id.
41
Id.
32
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process establishes some measure of legal presence even without a physical
presence.42
In the early part of the twentieth century, some lower courts held that
consent could allow courts to confer general jurisdiction rather than just
specific jurisdiction.43 Soon after, the Supreme Court endorsed the switch
to registration statutes being able to establish general jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.44 One
commentator described that the Pennsylvania Fire holding essentially
abandoned the Court’s previous ruling in St. Clair in three ways: “(1) it
differentiated between express and implied consent; (2) it permitted
registration statutes to confer general jurisdiction; and (3) it ignored the
notion of limited corporate presence.”45
However, Pennsylvania Fire was not the only case to address consent
to registration statutes, and though the Court’s decisions were mixed, they
actually tended away from construing registration-based consent as
allowing for general jurisdiction.46 The dividing line indicated in Robert
Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Construction Co., if there was one
at all, was whether the company itself had designated an agent for service
of process.47 The merger of Pennoyer’s “presence” with a corporation’s

42

Though this Note constrains general jurisdiction analyses to either power or consent,
commentators reference another less accepted basis, corporate presence, as a possible support for
general jurisdiction. See Monestier, supra note 11, at 1372 (“A very small minority of courts find that
registration statutes confer general jurisdiction over corporations based on a ‘presence’ theory of
jurisdiction.”); id. at 1374 (“Commentators are generally in agreement that this presence-based rationale
for general jurisdiction over corporations is not justifiable.”).
43
See Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)
(differentiating between what it considered express consent—where an out-of-state corporation
appointed its own agent—and implied consent, where the state appointed the agent on behalf of the
corporation, and holding there was consent to general jurisdiction in the former); Bagdon v. Phila. &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 1916) (holding the same and noting “[t]he
consent that [the appointed agent] shall represent the corporation is a real consent”).
44
243 U.S. 93, 94 (1917).
45
Kipp, supra note 30, at 22.
46
See, e.g., Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 408–09 (1929) (“The purpose of
state statutes requiring the appointment by foreign corporations of agents upon whom process may be
served is primarily to subject them to the jurisdiction of local courts in controversies growing out of
transactions within the State.”); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535
(1922) (noting that the Court “has indicated a leaning” away from interpreting registration statutes as
reaching beyond the bounds of the state); Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co.,
257 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1921) (In denying general jurisdiction when a company did not choose its own
agent on whom to serve process, Justice Holmes stated, “The purpose in requiring the appointment of
such an agent is primarily to secure local jurisdiction in respect of business transacted within the State.
Of course when a foreign corporation appoints one as required by statute it takes the risk of construction
that will be put upon the statute and the scope of the agency by the State Court.”).
47
257 U.S. at 216.
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consent to appoint an agent (in accordance with a state’s registration rules)
provided a fiction for the Court to establish general jurisdiction.48
When the Court decided International Shoe49 in 1945, it no longer
relied on the legal fiction of “presence” to establish personal jurisdiction
but instead inquired whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
were sufficient “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”50 The Court
subsequently interpreted International Shoe to not only disregard fictional
presence but also fictional consent in ascertaining a state’s jurisdictional
power over corporations.51
In Shaffer v. Heitner,52 the Court stated that “all assertions of statecourt jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny,”53 and “[t]o the extent that prior
decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.”54
However, the Shaffer Court’s apparent stripping of the pre-International
Shoe “presence” and “consent” standards as applied to registration statutes
was not complete, and “in the last paragraphs of the opinion, the Court
breathed new life into these statutes.”55 The majority noted, “[A]ppellants
had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court. Delaware,
unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats acceptance of a
directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State.”56 The dissent
questioned the need to include Delaware’s statutory shortcomings:
I cannot understand how the existence of minimum contacts in a constitutional
sense is at all affected by Delaware’s failure statutorily to express an interest
in controlling corporate fiduciaries . . . . Nor would I view as controlling or
even especially meaningful Delaware’s failure to exact from appellants their
consent to be sued. Once we have rejected the jurisdictional framework
created in Pennoyer v. Neff, I see no reason to rest jurisdiction on a fictional
outgrowth of that system such as the existence of a consent statute, expressed
or implied.57

48

Kipp, supra note 30, at 24.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
50
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 456, 463 (1940)).
51
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (“In a continuing process of evolution
this Court accepted and then abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’ as the standard for
measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations.”).
52
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
53
Id. at 212.
54
Id. at 212 n.39.
55
Kipp, supra note 30, at 30.
56
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 (footnote omitted).
57
Id. at 226–27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
49
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Unfortunately, the majority’s reference to Delaware’s statute has only
helped to muddy this area of the law and has led to inconsistent outcomes.
The question of whether registration-based consent is sufficient to assert
general jurisdiction is especially important now since Goodyear and
Daimler narrowed the sphere by which states can assert general jurisdiction
based on power. The Supreme Court is likely to see the wobbly logical
foundations of the registration-equals-consent rationale. If and when it
invalidates this practice, states will need another avenue to subject
corporations to jurisdiction. This Note provides such an avenue.
2. Registration-Based Consent is a Misnomer.—It is important to
note first that a party can waive Due Process Clause protection by
consenting to jurisdiction.58 Professor Tanya Monestier holds this as half
the relevant equation: the “consent equals personal jurisdiction” half.59 The
other then is the “registration equals consent” half.60 Professor Monestier
persuasively argues that a corporation’s mandatory registration within a
state is not consent.61 Given the seemingly facial incongruity of a
mandatory provision being designated voluntary,62 registration-based
consent fails under both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.
Despite Daimler’s silence on the issue of registration-based consent,
the decision set a high bar for a state to be able to assert general
jurisdiction.63 If even a “substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business” is insufficient to satisfy due process, merely registering to do
business seems unlikely to suffice.64 Every state mandates that nonresident
corporations conducting business within its borders register and appoint an
agent for service of process.65 As this Note will demonstrate, Daimler
would be rendered meaningless if courts decided to interpret registration
statutes as an implied consent or allowed states to exact express consent as
the cost of doing business.
58

Monestier, supra note 11, at 1379 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703–04 (1982)).
59
Id. at 1379.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Of course, one might argue that the mandatory compliance is only mandatory so far as a
corporation chooses to reap the benefits of conducting business within the borders of the state extracting
its consent. When pitted against the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, a state obtaining
consent merely for permitting interstate commerce is not a sufficient quid pro quo, as the remainder of
Section I.B.2 will illustrate.
63
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014) (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra
note 16, at 16 & n.7, 17 & n.8).
64
Id. at 760–61.
65
Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109 n.5 (Del. 1988) (citing ROBERT C. CASAD,
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 3.02[2][a] (1983)).
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Aside from the due process issue, the Supreme Court has previously
held this type of coerced consent runs afoul of the Commerce Clause
because states have limitations on the powers they can exercise over
nonresident corporations:
One of these limitations . . . aris[es] from the [C]ommerce [C]lause, whose
operation, as this court has said, is such that a corporation authorized by the
state of its creation to engage in interstate commerce “may not be prevented
by another state from coming into its limits for all the legitimate purposes of
such commerce.”66

The above quote demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause does not permit a state to exact its jurisdictional toll for
those corporate activities that exist outside its borders.
As Professor Monestier has asserted, and as the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed, after International Shoe, and especially after Daimler, any
state’s attempt to mandate consent as a threshold to conduct business is no
more than coercion, and cannot be called genuine consent. A corporation
cannot consent to something it does not realize it is consenting to, and
nearly all fifty states have registration statutes that are silent on the effects
of registering.67 Additionally, a corporation’s “choice” to simply not do
business in a state is not a real choice and certainly does not fit the
integrated nature of the modern economy.68
II.
A.

MAKING SENSE OF CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION
A Tale of Two Mylans: The Problem Materializes

As Section I.B.1 explained, state registration statutes are closely tied
to consent. Registration clauses can either explicitly condition consent as
part of the registration69 or allow for courts to read in implied consent

66

Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1914) (quoting W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 1, 27 (1910)); see also Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 13 (1877) (“Upon
principles of comity, the corporations of one State are permitted to do business in another, unless it
conflicts with the law, or unjustly interferes with the rights of the citizens of the State into which they
come.”).
67
Monestier, supra note 11, at 1387 & n.214 (“Technically, every one of the fifty registration
statutes is silent on the jurisdictional effects of registering to do business since Pennsylvania’s law that
registration confers general jurisdiction actually appears in its long-arm statute, not its registration
statute.”).
68
For a detailed discussion about how the lack of a real choice not to do business leads to coerced
consent for those states that attempt to assert general jurisdiction based on registration, see Monestier,
supra note 11, at 1387–401.
69
For example, when the Third Circuit decided Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637 (1991), it
quoted the Pennsylvania statute, which stated in relevant part
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simply by virtue of a corporation registering within a state (harkening back
to constructive consent based on fictional presence). The following two
cases feature the same defendant objecting to consent as an implied basis
for general personal jurisdiction. The cases were decided post-Daimler in
federal court in the District of Delaware by different federal judges, just
over two months apart, and came to diametrically opposed positions on the
issue of registration-based consent.
1. The AstraZeneca Case—In AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,70 the defendant, Mylan Pharmaceuticals (Mylan),
was both incorporated and had its principal place of business in West
Virginia.71 AstraZeneca, the plaintiff, asserted the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware had personal jurisdiction over Mylan based on
three theories: “(1) Mylan has consented to general jurisdiction in
Delaware, (2) Mylan is subject to specific jurisdiction in Delaware, and (3)
Mylan is subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware.”72 This Section will
focus only on the court’s resolution of the first assertion: that Mylan
consented to general jurisdiction.
AstraZeneca maintained that Mylan “consented to be subject to
Delaware’s general jurisdiction by registering to do business in the state
and by appointing a registered agent to accept service of process.”73 The
court acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether what it called
“statutory consent” (consent implied through registration) was sufficient to
satisfy personal jurisdiction.74 The relevant Delaware statutes require outThe existence of any of the following relationships between a person and this Commonwealth
shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to
exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person . . . . Corporations: (i) Incorporation
under or qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth[;] (ii)
Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent[;] (iii) The carrying on of a continuous and
systematic part of its general business within this Commonwealth.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a)(2) (Purdon 1990).
70
72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm.,
817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017).
71
Id. at 552.
72
Id. at 553 (citation omitted).
73
Id. at 555 (citation omitted).
74
Id. Compare Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The principles of
due process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with state domestication statutes.”), and
Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Not only does the
mere act of registering an agent not create Learjet’s general business presence in Texas, it also does not
act as consent to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute with any party anywhere concerning any
matter.”), with Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (“We need not decide whether
authorization to do business in Pennsylvania is a ‘continuous and systematic’ contact with the
Commonwealth . . . because such registration by a foreign corporation carries with it consent to be sued
in Pennsylvania courts.”), and Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990)
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of-state companies to complete various registration requirements as well as
appoint a designated agent to whom process can be served.75 AstraZeneca
pointed to the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Sternberg v. O’Neil,76
which established that “[e]xpress consent is a valid basis for the exercise of
general jurisdiction in the absence of any other basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction, i.e. ‘minimum contacts.’”77 Further, in addressing Daimler,
AstraZeneca maintained that the Court was concerned with a contactsbased analysis and not the issue of consent.78
The district court disagreed with AstraZeneca, finding that Daimler is
not confined only to minimum-contacts analyses and that all questions of
personal jurisdiction are entrenched in due process.79 Not only must
minimum contacts comport with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,”80 but consent-based jurisdiction must as well.81 The
court found no appreciable difference between “doing business”—
insufficient under Daimler to warrant having to defend against any
unrelated liabilities that may arise in a forum—and “doing business” while
being lawfully registered with the state.82 The court also brought up the
issue of perverse incentives, stating that “foreign companies that comply
with the statute in order to conduct business lawfully are disadvantaged,

(“We conclude that appointment of an agent for service of process under [the Minnesota statute] gives
consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether or not arising out of
activities within the state. Such consent is a valid basis of personal jurisdiction, and resort to minimumcontacts or due-process analysis to justify . . . jurisdiction is unnecessary.” (citation omitted)).
75
AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556. The Delaware statutes to which the court refers are DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 371, 376 (2016). Section 371 states,
No foreign corporation shall do any business in this State, through or by branch offices, agents
or representatives located in this State, until it shall have paid to the Secretary of State . . . [a
filing fee] and shall have filed in the office of the Secretary of State: (1) A certificate . . . issued
by an authorized officer of the jurisdiction of its incorporation evidencing its corporate
existence . . . ; (2) A statement executed by an authorized officer of each corporation setting
forth (i) the name and address of its registered agent . . . ; (ii) a statement . . . of the assets and
liabilities of the corporation, and (iii) the business it proposes to do in this State . . . .
§ 371(b). Section 376 outlines the procedure for service of process.
76
550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).
77
AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (quoting Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1111).
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)).
81
AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556.
82
Id. (“In light of the holding in Daimler, the court finds that Mylan’s compliance with Delaware’s
registration statutes—mandatory for doing business within the state—cannot constitute consent to
jurisdiction, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Sternberg can no longer be said to comport
with federal due process.”).
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whereas those who do not register and do business in Delaware illegally are
immune.”83
2. The Acorda Case—Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,84 decided only two months after the preceding case,
analyzed the same issue: whether complying with Delaware’s registration
statute (without an express condition of consent in the registration statute
itself) constituted valid consent.85 Because the AstraZeneca case had been
decided so recently within the same district, the judge in this case provided
a detailed analysis into the deliberative process that led him to draw the
opposite conclusion. Ultimately, the Acorda judge held that mere
compliance with the Delaware registration statute was sufficient to permit
the court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over Mylan.86
The Acorda court first pointed to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,87 which
stated, “Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of
all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”88 The judge
next turned to the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire89 for support that,
not only can the individual right of personal jurisdiction be waived, but a
valid method by which to waive is to consent “to the jurisdiction of the
courts in a particular state . . . by complying with the requirements imposed
by that state for registering or qualifying to do business there.”90
Additionally, the Acorda court used another Supreme Court case, Robert
Mitchell Furniture,91 to provide further clarification of Pennsylvania Fire.92
83

Id. at 557.
78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. Del. 2015), aff'd, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
625 (2017).
85
Id. at 576.
86
Id. at 583–84.
87
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
88
Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (quoting Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 704). The Acorda court also
pointed to this explanation later in the Bauxites decision:
In sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various
reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for
what it is—a legal right protecting the individual. The plaintiff’s demonstration of certain
historical facts may make clear to the court that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant as
a matter of law—i.e., certain factual showings will have legal consequences—but this is not the
only way in which the personal jurisdiction of the court may arise. The actions of the defendant
may amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court, whether voluntary or not.
Id. (quoting Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 704–05).
89
243 U.S. 93 (1917).
90
Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (discussing Pennsylvania Fire).
91
257 U.S. 213 (1921).
92
Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 585 (“The purpose in requiring the appointment of such an agent is
primarily to secure local jurisdiction in respect of business transacted within the State. Of course when a
84
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The court used “Pennsylvania Fire and its progeny” as ammunition
for interpreting registration as consent, but both it and Robert Mitchell
Furniture were decided years before International Shoe.93 It is difficult to
ignore Pennoyer’s underpinnings in both cases’ language as the Court
seems to be concerned with in-state service of process, a lynchpin of
Pennoyer, but relegated to a more secondary role after the contacts-based
test appeared in International Shoe. Indeed, the Acorda court noted, “The
Federal Circuit, whose interpretation on this point will be governing in
patent cases like this one, has not addressed the constitutionality of treating
registration to do business in a state as consent to the jurisdiction of courts
in that state.”94 If Pennsylvania Fire and its succeeding cases do as much
work on the issue of consent as Acorda seems to suggest, it strains
credulity that the federal circuits would remain split on the issue.
The court then addressed the current circuit split in the federal courts
on the issue of registration as consent before turning to Delaware’s
statutory and common law bases for upholding registration as valid to
imply consent.95 The court discussed the same statutes as did the
AstraZeneca court, noting that neither provision of the statute “expressly
addresses whether registration to do business in Delaware constitutes
consent to the general jurisdiction of courts in Delaware.”96 However, the
court addressed the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Sternberg,97
adding emphasis throughout and noting that Sternberg “unambiguously”
held that “[a] corporation that authorizes an agent to receive service of
process in compliance with the requirements of a state statute, consents to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in any action that is within the scope of
the agent’s authority.”98 All of this provides a strong stare decisis argument
in a pre-Daimler world but does little if Daimler mandates that a due
process analysis applies to consent-based jurisdiction in addition to
contacts-based jurisdiction. The court spent considerable time wrestling
with Daimler to address this issue.

foreign corporation appoints one as required by statute it takes the risk of the construction that will be
put upon the statute and the scope of the agency by the State Court . . . . Unless the state law either
expressly or by local construction gives to the appointment a larger scope, we should not construe it to
extend to suits in respect of business transacted by the foreign corporation elsewhere . . . .” (quoting
Robert Mitchell Furniture, 257 U.S. at 215–16)).
93
Id.
94
Id. (citation omitted).
95
Id. at 585–87.
96
Id. at 587.
97
550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).
98
Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 587 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1115–16).
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The court rightly assessed Mylan’s position that Daimler stands
broadly as an assertion that due process analyses restrict general
jurisdiction’s breadth and applies not only to contacts-based tests, but also
to consent; those restrictions now limit a company’s all-purpose liabilities
to only those forums where it is “at home.”99 The court found this argument
unpersuasive especially in light of the fact that Daimler only once mentions
any derivative of the word “consent” when it stated that its “1952 decision
in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. remains the textbook case
of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation
that has not consented to suit in the forum.”100 This provides quite the
impasse. On one hand, Daimler characterized “the exercise of general
jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business’” as “unacceptably
grasping.”101 On the other hand, the Daimler Court made no mention of
consent despite the near certainty that corporations which engage in this
level of substantial contact with a forum will almost certainly register to do
business in that forum and could be made to consent simply by virtue of
that fact.102
B.

The Current Landscape of Consent

The dispute between the two Mylan opinions disappears if one
imagines two scenarios: in one, suppose all fifty states had a statute at the
time Daimler was decided that mandated consent by virtue of registering
with the state, and registration is required to legally conduct business. In
this scenario, either Daimler would have been forced to touch on the
consent-by-registration issue or its ruling would have had zero practical
effect. In either case, whether Daimler did or did not overturn these types
of statutes, it would have provided an answer for lower courts. In the
99

Id. at 588.
Id. at 589 (citation omitted) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755–56 (2014)).
101
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 16, at 17.
102
The court in Acorda acknowledges this quandary:
100

Plainly, today’s holding is at one level in tension with the holding in Daimler that it would be
“unacceptably grasping” to find general jurisdiction over a corporation “in every State in which
a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” It seems
an odd result that while there is not general jurisdiction over a corporation in every state in
which the corporation does business, there may be general jurisdiction over a corporation in
every state in which that corporation appoints an agent to accept service of process as part of
meeting the requirements to register to do business in that state. But if consent remains a valid
basis on which personal jurisdiction may arise—and the undersigned Judge concludes that
Daimler did not change the law on this point—then this result, though odd, is entirely
permissible.
Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (citation omitted).
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opposite scenario, registration-based consent was never allowed, and
instead a company has to give voluntary consent to be subject to general
jurisdiction in a particular forum. In this case, the AstraZeneca court would
have needed to apply only a standard Daimler contacts test (which would
have failed) unless it found genuine consent. The opposition to consentbased jurisdiction would have dissipated since that opposition was clearly
based on a perception of mandatory or coerced consent.
Unfortunately, reality is not nearly as tidy as either of the two
scenarios above. Consent-based jurisdiction is, quite literally, all over the
map.103 The two Mylan cases dealt with a statute that did not expressly
provide for consent104 but rather was implied via case law.105 But do statutes
expressly mandating consent to general jurisdiction provide any more of a
justification for that consent? The AstraZeneca court hinted in a footnote
that perhaps there is some difference.106 However, once case law has
established implied consent as a valid basis for asserting general
jurisdiction, it seems unlikely that companies would be any less aware just
because case law—rather than statutory law—mandated it.107
103

See Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, and General
Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609 (2015). Benish thoroughly analyzes
the status of all fifty states’ registration statutes including the consequences of registering in terms of
jurisdictional consent under either the statutory provisions or case law and penalties for failure to
register. Id. at 1647–62. The statutes—accompanied by state court decisions when silent—run the
gamut from explicit consent to general jurisdiction written into the statute (Pennsylvania), to personal
jurisdiction only (Ohio), to implied consent to general jurisdiction (Nebraska, joining Delaware of
course), to many states with little or no case law and unclear consequences. Id. Additionally, Benish
outlines the current state of the federal circuits as to whether registration-based consent to general
jurisdiction violates or satisfies due process and lists the controlling case. Id. at 1611. The following
circuits find registration-based consent violates due process: First Circuit, Cossaboon v. Maine Medical
Center, 600 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2010); Fourth Circuit, Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d
745, 746–47 (4th Cir. 1971); Fifth Circuit, Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179,
180–81 (5th Cir. 1992); Seventh Circuit, Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245
(7th Cir. 1990); and Eleventh Circuit, Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286,
1293 (11th Cir. 2000). The circuits finding registration-based consent satisfies due process include the
Second Circuit, Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 2010); Third Circuit, Bane v. Netlink,
Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991); Eighth Circuit, Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d
1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990); and Ninth Circuit, King v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,
632 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2011). The Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits are all undecided. Benish, supra,
at 1611–12.
104
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 371, 376 (2016).
105
Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1115 (Del. 1988).
106
72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 557 n.6 (D. Del. 2014) (“The court limits its holding to Delaware’s statutes
specifically. The court does not address the more difficult question raised when state statutes expressly
indicate that foreign corporations consent to general jurisdiction by complying with the statutes.”).
107
Indeed, in Acorda, the court stated that although the Delaware statutes did not expressly state
that “registration to do business in Delaware constitutes consent to the general jurisdiction of courts in
Delaware, this has long been the definitive judicial interpretation of these statutes.” Acorda, 78 F. Supp.
3d at 587.
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Whether registration-based consent is express or implied, mandatory
compliance with a state’s registration statute (assuming a company wants
to do business there) and appointing an agent to whom process can always
be served harkens more to a Pennoyer determination of jurisdiction—
personal service in state satisfies the jurisdictional inquiry—than the
contacts-based International Shoe test. As Kevin Benish stated in his
student note, “[T]he turn to consent-by-registration after Daimler signals
the rise of Pennoyer’s ghost, a theory of general jurisdiction based on a
corporation’s compliance with state registration statutes.”108
Commentators, much like the courts, are split on whether registrationbased consent should satisfy the general jurisdiction analysis.109 Professor
Monestier aptly noted that “[c]alling registration consent does not actually
make it consent.”110 Professor Monestier goes on to attack consent on two
grounds: first, that it differs from what jurisdictionally passes as traditional
consent; and second, that the “registration and the appointment of an agent
for service of process are coercive and accordingly cannot amount to
consent, which by definition is a voluntary act.”111 The second of Professor
Monestier’s arguments makes intuitive sense, and she goes on to describe
in detail how the options provided to a corporation operating under
registration-based consent are not really viable.112 Certainly, if the Court in
Daimler was concerned about defendant corporations being subject to any
108

Benish, supra note 103, at 1611 (footnote omitted).
Compare Monestier, supra note 11, at 1379–80 (noting that corporate registration and the
appointment of an agent for service of process does not amount to consent, either express or implied, to
general jurisdiction), and Benish, supra note 103, at 1640 (arguing that registration-based consent
extending general jurisdiction over nonresident corporations is unconstitutional), with Cassandra Burke
Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction,
Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 670 (2015)
(finding that New York’s implied consent by registration does not violate due process).
110
Monestier, supra note 11, at 1379.
111
Id. at 1380.
112
Professor Monestier states:
109

[E]ven if the relevant statute provided ample notice that the registration and the appointment of
an agent for service of process would be deemed consent to all-purpose jurisdiction, this would
still not be consistent with due process. The notion of consent implies that a party has
alternatives . . . . Aside from registering to do business in the state and thereby consenting to
general jurisdiction, a corporation really only has one of two choices: not do business in the
state or do business in the state without registering and face whatever penalties the law ascribes.
The option of refraining from doing business in the state is not really a viable one for most
corporations. Since all fifty states have the same laws requiring registration, this ‘option’ really
amounts to a corporation simply not doing business at all in the United States. Thus, the choice
appears to be that a corporation can register to do business in a state and therefore consent to
being sued on any and all causes of action or it can simply refrain from doing business at all,
thereby abandoning its raison d’être.
Id. at 1389–90 (footnotes omitted).
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suit in any forum in which they conduct business at the whim of plaintiffs,
it seems nonsensical that it would allow the same result by virtue of fifty
state legislatures passing (or maintaining) registration statutes.
C.

Potential Solutions for States

What options do states have if they want to allow their citizens a
forum in which they can bring lawsuits against large, multinational
corporations for conduct not related to the forum? States may attempt to
transition to express-consent registration statutes perhaps expecting courts
to shy away from implying consent based on silent registration statutes in a
post-Daimler landscape. Section II.C.1 discusses one state, New York,
apparently attempting that. But as previously discussed, this is unlikely to
survive a due process inquiry. A more permanent solution is to attempt to
fashion a genuine consent-based remedy that both satisfies the due process
notions of “fair play and substantial justice” and allows for all-purpose
general jurisdiction over companies that do business within their borders.
Section II.C.2 discusses one such option, tax incentives, as a carrot by
which states could induce a more genuine voluntary consent—and pass
constitutional muster.
1. The Move to Express-Consent Statutes.—Depending on which
federal circuit has interpreted a state’s registration statute, the options vary.
If a state lies in one of the circuits holding that registration statutes silent on
consent establish general jurisdiction and do not violate due process, it can
wait until the Supreme Court weighs in on the issue and hope the Court
effectively guts Daimler and holds that it only applies in those cases where
a company never registered (and thus consented) in a state. Though this
Note argues that neither express-consent nor implied-consent registration
statutes satisfy due process—in accordance with Professor Monestier’s
reasoning113—express-consent statutes at least provide a more
straightforward inquiry. At a minimum, every state which has a registration
statute that does not expressly provide for consent to general jurisdiction
should take note of AstraZeneca’s rationale, which demonstrates a
preference for express-consent statutes over implied-consent statutes.114
113

See id.
Recall that the court indicated that express-consent statutes raised a more difficult issue than
Delaware’s current implied-consent statute, which the court found lacking to impute consent.
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 557 n.6 (D. Del. 2014). Also, recall the
discussion in Section I.B.1 where courts found some support for express consent over implied consent
in pre-International Shoe cases, even though their methodology for what constituted express and
implied consent was different. See Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S.
213 (1921); Smolik v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Bagdon v. Phila.
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916).
114
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New York is one example of a state trying to effect this change. With
the passage of New York Assembly Bill No. 6714,115 the state legislature
attempted to add the following language to its registration statute: “A
foreign corporation’s application for authority to do business in this state,
whenever filed, constitutes consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state for all actions against such corporation. A surrender of such
application shall constitute a withdrawal of consent to jurisdiction.”116
Notably, the Second Circuit is one of the circuits that finds due process
satisfied with a consent-by-registration assertion of general jurisdiction.117
So, New York is perhaps taking a page out of the AstraZeneca playbook
and trying to preempt the potential sea change.
The New York City Bar provided the following statement in
opposition to the bill:
The New York City Bar Association has determined not to support this
legislation because the rationales presented in favor of the legislation do not
outweigh the potential constitutional issues the bill would raise. In the
Association’s view, the proposed legislation raises significant potential issues
arising from the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.118

The report goes on to detail the Due Process Clause and Commerce
Clause concerns.119 Interestingly, although the association has constitutional
concerns, the Second Circuit has already held that due process is satisfied
with the implied-consent statute (presumably, the association disagrees
with that holding as well).120 However, this “fix” is likely to be short lived
should the Supreme Court weigh in on the issue.
2. Replacing Coerced Consent with Genuine Consent.—What
alternative options can states employ to withstand constitutional scrutiny?
Perhaps instead of the stick—consent to jurisdiction or leave the state and
lose business—states could employ the carrot to encourage corporations to
consent genuinely to jurisdiction in their courts. One option that has been
used to promote various states’ goals for years has been the tax system.121 If
115

The bill died in the state senate and was returned to the assembly on January 6, 2016. Assemb.
B. A06714, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=
&bn=A06714&term=2015&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y&Votes=Y [https://perma.cc/DRK92C46].
116
Id.
117
Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 77 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010).
118
N.Y. CITY BAR, REPORT ON LEGISLATION A.6714 1 (2015).
119
Id. at 1–3.
120
Spiegel, 604 F.3d at 77 n.1.
121
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382 (1996).
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a state has a goal of opening up its courts to allow for more suits between
its citizens and large corporations, it can utilize the same incentive-based
system it has used to achieve other goals—especially the goal of attracting
businesses to the state.
Nearly every state attempts to attract business with some form of
location incentive.122 As one commentator stated, “Scarcely a day passes
without some state offering yet another incentive to spur economic
development, often in an effort to attract a particular enterprise to the
state.”123 So the apparatus is already in place on which states can add the
jurisdictional piece. Given Daimler’s potential (and likely) reverberations,
states can look to package jurisdiction into the incentives that they are
already providing or set up other incentives designed solely to get
corporations to agree not to fight jurisdiction in the state. Whether or not
the incentives pass an internal cost−benefit analysis would depend on the
perceived value and importance a particular state places on general
jurisdiction for its citizens. These incentives will also still have to comport
with the Commerce Clause.124 Companies would have to ensure that one
remedy—genuine consent—to avoid a constitutional challenge under the
Due Process Clause does not lead to another one under the Commerce
Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Daimler shrank the potential
locations where a corporation can be subject to general jurisdiction, at least
under a power analysis. As states and courts interpret Daimler, consent will
122

Id. at 383–84 (noting that a survey demonstrated that only one of the forty-eight states that
responded, Wyoming, “had not enacted at least one location incentive between 1991 and 1993” (citing
Georganna Meyer & John Hassig, Economic Development Policy, 5 STATE TAX NOTES 1229, 1232–36
(1993))).
123
Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
124
Id. at 791. The potential impact of adding the jurisdictional element into potential incentivebased programs, and how that might affect those programs, is beyond the scope of this Note. However,
a jurisdiction-for-benefits program, even if combined with other incentives, will certainly come with
some of the same legal challenges that other incentive programs face. See, e.g., Jeanette K. Doran, The
People Versus Corporate Welfare: North Carolina’s Forsaken Opportunity to Reverse Perversion of
the Commerce Clause and to Reinvigorate the Public Purpose Doctrine, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 381,
387 (2011) (“[N]oble intentions do not warrant ignoble means, permissible ends do not dissolve
constitutional constraints, and North Carolina’s economic development efforts are not unfettered by the
Commerce Clause.”); Enrich, supra note 121, at 409 (stating that businesses bring most of the
challenges to tax incentives that “give improper advantages to local competitors”); Hellerstein &
Coenen, supra note 123, at 793 (“State tax incentives, whether in the form of credits, exemptions,
abatements, or other favorable treatment typically possess two features that render them suspect under
the rule barring taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce.” (footnote omitted)).
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be thrust under the microscope. The legal fictions employed before
International Shoe—and still being argued in the courts—will likely
disappear and leave either a “contacts-based” power analysis or an
“incentive-based” consent analysis, each providing more predictability for
states and corporations.
The proposition that mandatory registration equals consent, which in
turn equals general jurisdiction in potentially all fifty states, cannot survive
a due process analysis after Daimler. States seeking to maximize court
access for their citizens to these types of cases must adapt to the changes
that the Supreme Court has clearly announced. Presumably Sarah—the
unfortunate Idaho business owner from the initial scenario—will (and
should) be able to decide whether a carrot that Kansas dangles is worth the
risk of defending against unrelated suits in that state. But the stick, in the
form of either violating the law by not registering or being forced to defend
against lawsuits unrelated to the forum, cannot be the method by which
businesses “consent” in the modern era of interstate commerce.
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